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I. Introduction: The Circle of Life 
There is something intriguing about the opening scene 
of tJle Walt Disney movie "The Lion King." It is not 
just tJlat the animals are all speaking and singing-
tJlOugh the fact that nearly every Disney movie and so 
many other shared stories and fables include animals 
who have the ability to communicate their thoughts with 
us must tell us something about the human psyche in 
general. It is, rather, what the animals are singing. 
Mufasa, tJle current lion king, has a new son named 
Simba, and all oftJle animals of the jungle and the plains 
are gathering so tJlat Simba can be introduced to them 
in a customarily regal way. The animals sing about the 
"circle of life," and they fall to their knees when the 
new lion cub-the cub who will be king-is finally 
presented to them, held aloft on a rock precipice 
overlooking tJle kingdom. 
Now, "The Lion King" has been accused of a 
lawyer's-list of political correctness violations. It is, 
supposedly, sexist because it focuses on the life ofmale 
power-players; it is racist because the voices of the 
nasty characters are done by minorities; it is 
homophobic because the evil lion is drawn and voiced 
"effeminately"; and it is classist because it is, once 
again, a story of the comings and goings of royalty, 
life in the upper bourgeoisie-as if nothing of interest 
could happen to a lowly member of the proletariat or 
to someone lower on the food chain; as if no one would 
care to see a movie entitled "The Lion Peasant" or "The 
Slug King." 
Wheilier or not we agree wiili such criticisms, once 
voiced they inevitably affect our experience of the 
movie in retrospect. The point I wish to bring up, iliough, 
is not so much a criticism as it is a bit of confusion. I 
was confused during "The Lion King" because I could 
not understand why all of tJlese animals were so happy 
iliat another lion had been born. After all, it won't be 
long until Simba is hunting, killing, and eating most of 
these creatures who are attending his presentation party 
wiili such joy. 
Some explanation is given a few minutes into the 
film when Mufasa is showing Simba around the jungle 
and explaining this "circle of life" of which everyone 
was singing earlier. He tells Simba that even tJlough 
tl1e lions eat the antelope, for instance, one day tl1e lions 
will die and their bodies will decay, which will fertilize 
the grass so that tl1e next generation of antelope will 
have sometl1ing to eat. Everybody helps everybody else 
in tl1e circle of life-it is a balanced community of 
cooperative eating and being eaten. 
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At this point, I am afraid that I find myself in 
agreement with Terrence Rafferty, film critic for the 
New Yorker, who remarks that Mufasa's claim " 'We're 
all connected' [through the eating chain is] ...easy for 
him to say; it seems unlikely that the antelopes share 
this philosophical serenity."j Indeed, one wonders if 
the antelope consider this "circle of life" to be a 
community at all; no doubt they would tell a different 
story if they had the power of the narrative pen. 
But this raises many important and interesting 
questions. Is there such a thing as an animal community, 
and if so, how are its members determined? How is 
this community created and does it include humans? 
Disney, of course, is just one inS!1l1lce of humanity's 
tendency to anthropomorphize animals. In such stories 
we tend to see projections of ourselves, and surely in 
"The Lion King," the lions are "the humans of the 
jungle." They have the power to speak for the rest, and 
upon closer inspection Mufasa's speech about the 
"circle of life" sounds very human, echoing the same 
attitudes and philosophies which keep modem society 
content with the institutions of pets, zoos, factory 
farming and all of our carnivorous and exploitative 
traditions in general. 
Human communities and a human communitarian 
ethic have existed for sometime. The former have 
been studied and the latter have been debated 
extensively. But little attention has been given to a 
deeper sense of community-a community without 
species boundaries-and to the ethic which might 
result. I would like to propose that community is not 
limited to human members. Communal membership 
and, consequently, communitarian moral status extend 
beyond the seemingly arbitrary boundaries of our 
human societies and collectivities. My goal is to suggest 
how this is so from tlle particular vantage point of 
continental philosophy and, more specifically, 
phenomenology-adiscipline which has much to say 
on the subject. 
II. Possible Paths Toward Community: 
Animal Phenomenology 
There are several ways in which animal membership 
in a communitarian ethic can be established.2 The first 
uses community in a somewhat loose way and seeks to 
demonstrate that animals are individuals-that they 
count as moral beings-and thus they are to be 
considered members of the community of persons. 
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Phenomenology's role in such an endeavor is, actually, 
quite import1U1t. The traditional problem has been that 
animals3 seem incapable of possessing goods and 
reflecting on their actions. To take a typical and often 
quoted example, consider Aquinas' discussion of 
irrational creatures: 
Strictly speaking we cannot will goods to 
irrational creatures because they cannot "have" 
goods in the proper sense of the word 
... [J]udgement is the power of one judging 
insofar as he can judge about his own 
judgement.. ..But to judge about one's own 
judgement belongs only to reason which 
reflects upon its own act. ... Hence, the whole 
root of freedom is located in reason.4 
To this, Peter Drum adds the following inter-
pretation. Aquinas, he argues, is suggesting that 
irrational creatures are not proper good-
possessors... [because] they are not proper 
beneficiaries of other-regarding acts ....The 
point is that only rational beings are capable 
of reflective awareness or self-consciousness: 
They can be aware of being aware, Le., aware 
of their own beliefs, thoughts andjudgements.5 
It is helpful here to shift the focus of this inquiry 
from questions concerning rationality-a loaded-term 
often irrationally tossed about-to questions of 
intentionality. After all, the problem seems to focus-
for Aquinas and many others-on an animal's ability 
for reflective awareness, the state of being aware of 
being aware. In other words, animals are often left out 
of the moral community of persons because it is 
assumed that they have no phenomenologicallife-or 
at least one to which we do not have access. 
But is this fair? Initially, it seems straightforwardly 
impossible to posit animal phenomenology, for the 
whole idea of phenomenological analysis is that the 
phenomenologist has access to his or her own 
consciousness and experience and therefore has a 
special and secure knowledge. I might not actually be 
in my office right now as I write these words. I might 
be hallucinating, tricked, or a brain in a vat, but there is 
one thing ofwhich I am sure: I am having the experience 
of being in my office. It is a bit of secure knowledge 
like no other. And by studying the structures of such 
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experiences we can come to uncover the structures of 
consciousness itself-the interplay of presence and 
absence, the various modes of presentation of objects, 
etc. The problem is that making claims about animal 
experience seems to overstep the boundaries of 
phenomenology. TIle practicing phenomenologist does 
not have access to the experience of the animal and 
thus cannot make claims as to its structure. 
This is mistaken for a variety of reasons, not the 
least of which is human arrogance and hubris. Why is 
it that Husserl (or any other phenomenologist) would 
think that phenomenology is valid for anyone but 
themselves? That is, since I do not have access to the 
consciousness of a Frenchman, why would I think that 
I have the right to speak about structures of conscious-
ness in Frenchmen? Naturally, because I must assume 
a basic similarity between my own experience and the 
experience of the Other. Nationality, race, class, and 
.gender all surely affect one's horizon of experience, 
yet the basic, generic structures of consciousness itself 
must be assumed as a constant. But why stop here? Why 
not allow species to be one characteristic of an 
individual that affects the shape of her experience but 
not the basic structure of that experience? The problem 
is that we cannot have our cake and eat it too. If we do 
not include animals in our phenomenology then we 
should not include any Others. To put it another way, 
in what sense do we not have access to animal 
experience? One could argue that our experience is 
fundamentally the experience of a living being, the 
experience of an animal, and then the experience of a 
human. Our humanity filters our world and alters our 
horizon of possible experience, but it does not dictate 
an exclusive structure to consciousness. 
Yet, even if we assume that we do not have direct 
access to animal consciousness and thus cannot speak 
properly of animal phenomenology, it is possible that 
such a phenomenology could be reconstructed. Husserl 
never published on the notion of reconstructive 
phenomenology in his lifetime, but the Nachlass texts 
have scattered references.6 Here, Husserl suggests 
reconstructing what the intentional life ofa human infant 
must look like. The practicing phenomenologist has no 
access to infantile consciousness-to burgeoning 
human intentionality in its most early stages-but 
Husserl suggests that we can reconstruct the structures 
of such a wakeful life. 
A similar story, then, could be told of animals. 
Observing animal behavior we are quick to posit such 
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structures as identity synthesis, the experience of 
multi-sensory unities, presence and absence, etc. The 
cat who waits for the mouse to re-emerge from the 
hole in the floorboard seems to be presencing the 
mouse as absent. The mouse was here before 
(presenced as present) but he is not here now 
(presenced as absent). If the mouse were not being 
presenced as absent, the cat, we imagine, would not 
be waiting and staring so intensely. Furthermore, the 
dog who hears a noise and rushes to the door to growl 
at the mailman seems to be experiencing the world as 
made up of multi-sensory unities. The creak of the 
mailbox lid being opened, footfalls on the porch, etc. 
are auditory aspects related to a rich mUlti-sensory 
unity-a unity for which the dog expects to have visual 
confirmation when he rushes to the door. The mailman, 
we conclude, is a unified collection of sounds and 
images and smells, etc. 
These are relatively important accomplishments, and 
there seems to be no reason to refuse to believe that 
most animals are in possession of rich intentional lives 
and thus have the right to be thought of as individuals-
persons-within the moral community.7 
II. Community through Commonality 
But this is a community only in a libertarian and, I would 
suggest, improper sense. A community, one might 
argue, is not a collection of isolated monadic individuals 
but, rather, a union of interrelated group-members 
bound together by commonalties. If we work with this 
notion of community, is it possible to argue that 
nonhuman animal life can still claim membership? 
What, in fact, do we have in common with animals that 
might lead to the establishment of a community? 
The ftrst and most obvious answer to this question 
is that we share a common world and thus a common 
future with animals. This is no startling claim. Our 
interconnection with animals and the living world is, 
in some sense, commonsensical, though it tends to be 
obscured by our contemporary lifestyle-a way of 
being-in-the-world such that our relatedness is 
"suppressed."8 Hamburger does not come from a 
grocery and spotted owls do not exist to play the role 
of political pawns, no matter the degree to which the 
world might appear so. 
A common critique of such communitarian 
foundations, though, is that we tend to include animals 
in the community only to the degree to which they are 
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important to and otherwise affect us. That is, animals 
are added to our community as we grow to realize their 
importance to human existence. Such an anthro-
pocentric ethic does not sit well with deep ecologists 
such as Dave Foreman, co-founder of Earth First!' 
Foreman rejects such notions as "ahuge failure ofmoral 
imagination" and argues that "[a]ll living things have 
intrinsic value, inherent worth ....They live for 
themselves, for their own sakes, regardless of any real 
or imagined value to human civilization."9 
But there are many examples of non-anthropocentric 
theories based on human and animal interconnections. 
Some Native American world-views are excellent 
examples of such theory and practice. John Mohawk's 
important work in providing a communitarian reading 
of the Iroquois Confederacy's oral tradition suggests 
that the Six Iroquois Nations lived by a "deep 
ecological" or "deep communal" rule where humans 
are said to be in community with animals, plants, 
rivers, air, etc. The laws of justice established by the 
Six Nations covered not only the human citizens but 
the other members of the community as well. Such a 
form of communitarianism-a lived theory with a 
long history before it was forcibly eradicated by 
physically destroying its practitioners-is well worth 
greater study.lO 
And there are other approaches to community 
through commonality. Alphonso Lingis' recent work 
suggests that there is a "Community in Death" of which 
humans and animals are members in virtue of the fact 
that we are all mortal.ll This is intriguing because 
species kinship plays no role in Lingis' view of 
community-the Other, human or animal, shares a 
connection to me when I put myself "wholly in the place 
of the death that gapes open" for her.12 
Death, though, is only part of the story of our lives, 
and perhaps it is the case that we share more of this 
story-more than the final death scene-with animals. 
Building a community on the foundation of a shared 
story or the on-going process of narrative creation is 
another communitarian tradition with a rich history. 
Stanley Hauerwas, Alasdair MacIntyre, and David Carr 
have written in this area, though none has dealt 
extensively with the specific topic at hand-that of 
determining the role of nonhuman animal life in the 
creation of the stories which "inflate us to life" and 
provide us with meaning. 
Carr, for instance, has some insight into the role of 
narrative in human communities. He suggests that 
Summer & Fall 1994 
[a]t whatever level or size or degree of 
complexity, a community exists wherever a 
narrative account exists of a we which has 
continuous existence through its experiences 
and activities. When we say that such an 
account "exists," we mean to say that it gets 
articulated or formulated, perhaps by only one 
or a few of the group's members, in terms of 
the we and is accepted or subscribed to by the 
other members. It is their acceptance that 
makes them members, [and] constitutes their 
recognition of the others as fellow members.... 
To be a participant or member in this sense, 
and to posit a we as group-subject of such a 
communal story, are really the same thing. 13 
One of the problems with such an account is that it 
fails to recognize the power of the story-teller and thus 
the possibility that certain characters in the communal 
story are marginalized---even written-out. Carr suggests 
that one's acceptance of the narrative makes one a 
member of the "we." The point, at first, seems to be 
well taken. I am quite sure that when the Ku Klux Klan 
rallies under slogans such as "We believe in a white 
America," the we fails to refer to me because I do not 
accept a role in that narrative-the Ku Klux Klan story 
is not my story.14 And the point can be made in less 
extreme situations as well. When Native Americans or 
Scandinavians or Buddhists speak of a "we" and tell a 
story which is "ours," I know that the "we" does not 
include me-these stories and thus these communities 
are not mine. 
But this is too simplistic. It is an inaccurate view of 
the way narrative operates, because it takes for granted 
the fact that I am free to choose the story in which I am 
enmeshed. But is this so? If I hear someone say, "We 
have become obsessed with O. J. Simpson," or if 
President Clinton goes on television and declares "We 
will not lift the Cuban embargo," in what sense am I 
free to say that these "we" ,s do not include me? Whether 
or not I agree with the Cuban embargo, am I not a part 
of the story through my action and even inaction--does 
this narrative not encompass me, with or without my 
consent? Indeed, if Carr is correct, such stories not only 
include me, they constitute me. I am what I am in virtue 
of the "we" of the narratives in which I find myself 
enmeshed. To assume otherwise is to posit an initial 
state where humans are isolated individuals, picking 
and choosing the narratives and thus communities in 
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which they wish to participate-a fundamentally non-
communitarian assumption of what it is to be human. 
Consequently, communities, we must conclude, are not 
always constituted through consent. 
This point becomes especially clear when we 
consider the role of animals in narrative. Clearly, 
animals are part of "our" story. What we do affects 
them; what they do affects us. In fact, this us/them 
distinction is fundamentally misdirected, since the 
narrative is common: humans and animals strut and 
fret, acting out their parts in a common space, within 
a common story. The difference is that animals do not 
seem capable of validating the narrative which humans 
construct for them. Recounting our history and 
preparing for our future, we tell the stories of where 
we have been and where we are going. We have spread 
across the earth and cut trails through the land. We 
have thinned the forests, and lawn-and-gardened the 
soil, blackened the skies and spiked the water. We have 
domesticated the tasty animals and attempted to 
eradicate the pests. We have fought one another and 
loved one another, and we hope to go on telling our 
story for many more years. 
But do we have this right? When we say, "Our 
Hoover dam is a great dam-it would be best for us to 
build some more," who are "we"? "We" certainly must 
include the varieties of nonhuman animal life caught 
up in the story. "We," in some sense, refers to this life, 
but there is something improper about this reference 
because it is always and only uttered by humans. The 
"we" of such statements picks out human and animal 
alike, but there is something inauthentic about the way 
it does so to animals. Inevitably, we humans represent 
animals in the common tale we construct, but we do it 
willy-nilly. I 5 
Is there any way around this, though? How can we 
consider and represent animal perspectives when we 
cannot hear animal voices? Some Deep Ecologists 
would claim that this approach is misdirected from the 
start because we have favored human stories and 
overlooked the fact that the story we tell is one of many 
concurrent tales, none more important than the rest in 
the non-hierarchical structure of nature. Perhaps, it all 
comes down to power-which the narrator has 
absolutely. The story-teller casts the parts, sets the 
scenes, and interprets the plotlines, and those unnamed 
characters to which the "we" emptily refers have no 
say in the matter-unless they rip the pen from the story-
teller's hand and write their own account. 
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If we are to say, tllOugh, that there is a right to 
revolution in narrative, and if we are to maintain that 
"we" can be used improperly-that it has been used 
improperly when we speak for the human and animal 
community without allowing the voices of animals to 
be heard and the goods of animals to be voiced-we 
are left with a difficult situation. If the "we" refers 
emptily, then we must assume that there is some more 
appropriate "we"-some more proper community-
than the one which the narrative "we" picks out and, 
supposedly, creates. In other words, if the narrative 
"we" constitutes the community, how can it ever be 
wrong? To what standard could we appeal when we 
offer our critique? 
IV. Phenomenology and Deep Community 
Here is where the true force of phenomenology's 
response is to be felt, for there is a more foundational 
level ofcommunity than that which is brought into being 
through narrative-there is a more basic "we" which 
can be disclosed through phenomenological analysis. 
In Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation, he 
suggests that I never experience myself as an isolated, 
monadic individual but, rather, as a self among Others. 
In fact, the Ego and the Other are constituted in unison 
and in conjunction with the network of Others which 
forms my community. As the Ego arises in sense, so 
does the Other, and this fundamental presence of the 
Other founds my experience of the world as public. 
Such phenomenological truths become evident, 
Husserl maintains, when we attempt to perform a 
"reduction to a sphere of ownness.'.' "As regards 
methods," he explains, 
a prime requirement for proceeding correctly 
here is that first of all we carry out, inside the 
universal transcendental sphere. a peculiar 
kind of epochi... [where] we disregard all 
constitutional effects ofintentionality relating 
immediately or mediately to other subjectivity 
and delimit first of all the total nexus of that 
actual and potential intentionality in which the 
ego constitutes within himself a peculiar 
owness. [sic] Buthere something remarkable 
strikes us: The psychic life of my Ego 
.. .including my whole world-experiencing life 
and therefore including my actual and possible 
experience of what is other, is wholly 
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unaffected by screening off what is other. . .1, 
the reduced "human Ego"... am constituted, 
accordingly, as a member of the "world"... 16 
In other words, if we attempt to strip the layers of 
experience until we arrive at a foundational level where 
the experience does not reiy on the presence of what is 
alien or other (Le., we uncover the sphere of ownness), 
we discover that the project is an immediate failure. 
Even the most basic experience of my own Ego is 
dependent on the Other; we necessarily live in an 
intersubjective world. 
Now, what if we alter this argument in an attempt 
to uncover the poinLat which animals make their 
appearance in our experience? That is, we would 
attempt "a reduction to a sphere of human-ownness"-
stripping away any experience of what is nonhuman 
in an effort to uncover some foundational level of 
experience which does not include the experience of 
nonhuman animal life and is in no way dependent on 
such life for its meaning. 
Attempting such a reduction we are once again 
struck by something remarkable. Even at the most 
fundamental level of experience, we find the presence 
of the animal-Other. The world, that is, is experienced 
as a common world-a world in which the human and 
the nonhuman animal necessarily acknowledge a mutual 
publicity. We cannot screen offor strip away the animal-
Other, for it would mean stripping away our own 
humanity and even our ability-the possibility of our 
ability-to have experience. 
In many ways, this phenomenological fact is born 
out by empirical evidence as well. Mary Midgley 
speaks of a "well-filled stage," populated by members 
of "the mixed community," and maintains that "[a]1I 
human communities have involved animals."l7 Such 
anthropological/sociological evidence cannot count as 
phenomenological proof, but it is consistent with our 
phenomenological findings. Thus, when Kenneth 
Shapiro claims, in the editor's introduction to the first 
issue of Society and Animals, that there is a 
"pervasiveness" of animals in our life and that "our 
world is ... replete with animals in the street, home, 
nursing home, consulting room, at the 'feeder,' in the 
city alley and city park, ... on the farm, in the stream, in 
the wild,',18 he speaks to the obvious truth of a 
communal world-the obvious historical-empirical fact 
that there is no such thing as a human conununity that 
is not in the midst of allimals,l9 
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To be members of a mixed community is to share a 
world, but more than this, it is to acknowledge that the 
appearing world is this shared world-a common world 
on which humans and animals have different 
perspectives. Intersubjective Goods, then, are one aspect 
of this public world. In the same way that I take the 
Hoover dam to be a public object-i.e., in the same 
way that I take my perspective here to be a perspective 
on the same object which you have a perspective on 
over there-so, too, are Goods necessarily public. What 
I take to be good from my perspective, you can take to 
be good or bad from yours. The same action that a 
human considers good is good or bad from an animal 
perspective as well. 
This is a strong claim. Itamount~ to more than saying 
that what we do affects each other, animals included. It 
is to say that our shared community is essentially 
soaked with morality. Robert Sokolowski has put the 
point succinctly: 
We have no choice about adopting the moral 
point of view. We exist morally not by virtue 
of a decision, but by virtue of the fact that we 
share a world with other agents, and that what 
seems good to us will usually show up as good 
or bad to others, that as good or bad for others 
it can be good or bad for us, that there can 
consequently be both conflicts and harmonies 
in the intersection of goods and bads.... [T]hat 
is the way we are ... we are moral by the way 
we exist with others.20 
Morality, then, is not a choice but a way of being in 
the world. Our good is tied up with the goods of those 
with whom we share the world; indeed, these goods 
are not actually separate goods but are perspectives on 
a common Good. It is phenomenologically impossible 
to suppress this publicity-to suppress our moral 
connection with the living world-though many of our 
actions and most past philosophical ethics do not begin 
with this proper foundation. 
Our community is a deep one, and I would like to 
use this term, Deep Community, to refer to the 
collectivity uncovered and the common Goods 
disclosed through phenomenological analysis. The 
Deep Community is one in which animals claim full 
membership and animal goods stand at the same level 
as human goods. Many deep ecological claims are at 
home in such a tlleory, for animal status and worth is 
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not dependent on an animal's usefulness to humanity 
or on our granting such status and worth to animals. 
Indeed, Deep Community "gets underneath" anthro-
pomorphism, showing how such a mistake is possible 
and explaining the necessary preconditions and 
assumptions resting behind its faulty reasoning. 
Anthropomorphism is a privileging of the human 
perspective on the Good and it is fundamentally 
contradictory-both (a) in the sense that it must 
recognize the publicity of the common Good while at 
the same time characterizing this common Good as a 
human good and (b) in that anthropomorphic theories 
attempt to account for the presence of the animal-Other 
in terms that are wholly familiar and "of the Self."21 
Deep Community, then, dictates a Deep Commu-
niurrianism. We can come to a better understanding of 
our duties and of who "we" are through the variety of 
ways I have been discussing. We learn more about each 
other-about the phenomenological life of animals, for 
instance-and we learn something about the way in 
which the Good appears from the perspective of the 
Other. We uncover what we have in common-a life, a 
death, and a destiny-and we tell our stories of 
commonality, our narratives which further define who 
"we" are, where we have been, and where the "circle 
of life"-now understood in its deep and rich sense-
will lead us next. 
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